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Incongruent selves in social media and
privacy law: Proposing a humanistic
psychological intervention
Yvonne Apolo*
In our present culture of information fetishism and the frivolous pursuit of
visibility, the parameters of the private sphere are shifting in unusual ways.
Rather than staunchly guarding one’s private life, many are seemingly
complicit in the demise of their own privacy through, for example, the sharing
of personal matters to large social media audiences, or via a more passive
participation in networked technologies. The fragmentary, and somewhat
feeble, state of privacy law in Australia is illustrative of law’s ambivalence
towards this contemporary privacy subject. As extant doctrines and
discourses struggle to accommodate the incongruences surrounding our
engagement with privacy in the networked digital era, this article aims to
bring to the law of privacy a more nuanced understanding of subjectivity and
the conditions needed to pursue its purported aims. Specifically, this article
seeks to explore the potential of Rogerian humanistic psychology to
generate an alternative framework within which to critique, re-conceive and
transform the dispositions of law’s imagined privacy subject.
I An introduction to contemporary privacy concerns
When you look at the kind of information that people publish about themselves it
makes you wonder. I used to think that a telephone conversation was normally
private but you can’t walk down the street without hearing a number of telephone
conversations.1
— Former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia,
Murray Gleeson
If there were any doubts remaining as to the societal value placed on
privacy,2 they were recently put to rest in the form of the #DeleteFacebook
* Yvonne Apolo is a Lecturer and PhD candidate in Law at the University of Wollongong. The
author would like to thank Associate Professor Cassandra Sharp for her generosity, patience
and encouragement during this writing process. The author is also grateful for the invaluable
comments and support provided by Dr Brett Heino and Ryan Kernaghan, as well as the
helpful conversations had with Associate Professor Marett Leiboff, Dr Richard Mohr and
Dr Victoria Colvin.
1 Speech to the National Press Club, August 2008, reported by Nicola Berkovic, ‘Why privacy
just isn’t what it used to be’, The Australian, 22 August 2008, 17.
2 In 2010, eg, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg (in)famously stated that ‘privacy is no longer
a social norm’: Emma Barnett, ‘Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg says privacy is no longer a
“social norm”’, The Telegraph (online), 11 January 2010 <www.telegraph.co.uk/tech
nology/facebook/6966628/Facebooks-Mark-Zuckerberg-says-privacy-is-no-longer-a-social-
norm.html>, 11 years after Sun Microsystems CEO Scott McNealy proclaimed that ‘[y]ou
have zero privacy anyway. Get over it’: Polly Sprenger, ‘Sun on Privacy: “Get Over It”’,
WIRED (online), 26 January 1999 <www.wired.com/1999/01/sun-on-privacy-get-over-it>.
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movement; an online movement sparked by the ‘Cambridge Analytica
scandal’,3 which has thus far encouraged one quarter of Facebook members to
either delete or change the privacy settings of their accounts.4 Paradoxically,
however, statistics also suggest that the average daily engagement of
Facebook users increased in the wake of #DeleteFacebook, and that other key
Facebook metrics remain steady.5 As such, the recent debate regarding the
manner in which social media giants and third-party data brokers utilise
personal information further illuminates the complex contradictions that
characterise much of our contemporary engagement with privacy. In light of
such inconsistencies (and against the backdrop of Australia’s ambivalent
privacy law framework),6 this article seeks to shed new light on our seemingly
pathological relationship with privacy and explore the conceptual tools
required for law to adequately understand and respond to this contemporary
privacy concern. In doing so, this article will introduce to the law of privacy
a humanistic psychological framework, premised upon a nuanced
understanding of the ideal processes and conditions within which the goals of
self-actualisation and human flourishing can be fostered. The thesis of this
article is that by better understanding its human subject and our material
engagement with privacy, privacy law could more effectively achieve its
purported aims of nurturing human dignity, autonomy and flourishing.7
While the character of this article is conceptual — seeking to elucidate a
model of subjectivity that the legal protection of privacy should seek to
recognise and promote — a brief consideration of the various privacy-related
issues surrounding the Cambridge Analytica scandal will serve to illustrate
and contextualise the problems that the legal protection of privacy currently
faces. These are problems that appear to be qualitatively different from those
contemplated by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, when they famously
penned the ‘right to privacy’ in 1890,8 or by Cottenham LC when, in 1849, he
sowed the seeds for the recognition of privacy at common law.9 As such, the
remainder of this Part will be divided into two sections. The first section will
discuss the privacy concerns associated with the Cambridge Analytica
scandal. The second section will briefly locate these contemporary concerns in
3 The details of which will be briefly set out in Part I(A).
4 See, eg, John Glenday, #DeleteFacebook movement builds up steam (18 June 2018) The
Drum <www.thedrum.com/news/2018/06/18/deletefacebook-movement-builds-up-steam>.
5 See, eg, Jake Kanter, The backlash that never happened: New data shows people actually
increased their Facebook usage after Cambridge Analytica scandal (20 May 2018) Business
Insider <www.businessinsider.com.au/people-increased-facebook-usage-after-cambridge-an
alytica-scandal-2018-5?r=US&IR=T>.
6 To date, Australia has been reluctant to protect privacy rights at common law: see Australian
Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199 (‘Lenah’); cf
Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1 and Wilson v Ferguson [2015] WASC 15 (16 January
2015). In addition, despite recommendations to the contrary, Australia lacks a statutory tort
of privacy: see, eg, Australian Law Reform Commission (‘ALRC’), Serious Invasions of
Privacy in the Digital Era: Final Report, Report No 123 (2014).
7 Aims entrenched within the Western philosophical roots of privacy: see, eg, Carolyn Doyle
and Mirko Bagaric, Privacy Law in Australia (Federation Press, 2005) 26–56; Andrew
McStay, Privacy and Philosophy: New Media and Affective Protocol (Peter Lang, 2014).
8 Samuel D Warren and Louis D Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890) 4 Harvard Law
Review 193.
9 Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 1 H & Tw 1; 47 ER 1302.
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the context of the historical relationship between legal discourses of privacy
and the development of technologies that contest ‘conventional
understandings of individual subjectivity’.10 At the close of this section the
role of humanistic psychology in unravelling the complexities that currently
impact upon the legal protection of privacy will be foreshadowed.
The remainder of this article will then proceed in the following way. As a
necessary preface to the application of humanistic concepts in the context of
Australian privacy law,11 Part 2 will describe the key legal problems to which
humanistic psychology is poised to respond. While a detailed account of
Australia’s privacy law framework is beyond the scope of this article,12 the
overview provided in this Part exposes the shortcomings of an increasingly
informational account of privacy in responding to contradictory privacy
behaviours. In Part 3, key humanistic psychological concepts (particularly
drawn from the works of Carl Rogers) will be introduced in an attempt to
enhance privacy law’s understanding of human subjectivity and the
relationship between subject-formation and material experiences. In
particular, this Part will describe the concepts of ‘congruence’ and ‘empathetic
relationality’, which illuminate the significance of consistency between one’s
understanding of self and actual experience as well as the important role that
relationships and social institutions play in fostering the attainment of
self-consistency. Part 4 will then deploy these concepts in the context of
privacy law in order to expose our incongruence. Importantly, this Part will
demonstrate how a humanistic psychological intervention can present a
challenge to the prevalent logic in privacy law and literature that so readily
reduces the concept of privacy to an informational dimension and, in so doing,
struggles to recognise the privacy interests of individuals once information has
been transacted.
A The ‘Cambridge Analytica scandal’: A vignette
The recent furore over Facebook’s questionable privacy practices was
reignited on 17 March 2018, when The New York Times and The Guardian’s
Observer exposed how the London-based data analytics firm, ‘Cambridge
Analytica’, harvested personal information from over 50 million Facebook
users, to allegedly predict and influence voters in the US election and Brexit
referendum.13 Contributing to the public outcry that emanated from these
10 David Lindsay, ‘An Exploration of the Conceptual Basis of Privacy and the Implications for
the Future of Australian Privacy’ (2005) 29 Melbourne University Law Review 131, 141.
11 The choice of jurisdiction for the focus of this article is a product of: (i) the jurisdiction from
which the author is writing and (ii) the hesitance and ambivalence that surround the legal
protection of privacy in Australia (discussed in Part II).
12 For a more detailed account of the legal protection of privacy in Australia, see, eg, ALRC,
Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era, above n 6; Doyle and Bagaric, Privacy Law
in Australia, above n 7; Barbara McDonald, ‘A statutory action for breach of privacy: Would
it make a (beneficial) difference?’ (2013) 36 Australian Bar Review 241; David Rolph et al,
Media Law: Cases, Materials and Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2015) pt 5.
13 Matthew Rosenberg, Nicholas Confessore and Carole Cadwalladr, ‘How Trump Consultants
Exploited the Facebook Data of Millions’, The New York Times (online), 17 March 2018
<www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-trump-campaign.html>;
Carole Cadwalladr and Emma Graham-Harrison, ‘Revealed: 50 million Facebook profiles
466 (2018) 22 Media and Arts Law Review
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revelations was the seemingly deceptive manner in which this information
was acquired. To condense a quite complicated series of events, the data used
by Cambridge Analytica was obtained in 2014 by way of a personality quiz
called ‘thisismydigitallife’, which was originally designed by Dr Aleksandr
Kogan,14 and hosted on Facebook. Through the use of an ‘informed consent’
process, when 270 000 people took this personality quiz the app was able to
gain access not only to their Facebook profiles but also to the profiles of their
(unwitting) Facebook friends.15 This allowed the initially modest data set to
increase to a projected total of 87 million profiles, including those of
311 112 Australians. The data Cambridge Analytica eventually obtained16 was
detailed enough to build robust ‘psychographic’ models capable of
understanding the personality of both the subjects of the data and a much
larger collection of similar people on Facebook.17 By combining the harvested
information with quantitative psychological techniques,18 Cambridge
Analytica was able to identify the kinds of micro-targeted advertisements that
would be most effective to persuade specific personalities or specific
geographic regions for particular political purposes.19 In the words of
whistleblower Christopher Wylie, Cambridge Analytica collected the personal
information of millions of Facebook users to create a powerful ‘psychological
warfare tool’.20
This scandal has incited much public debate as to the ethical obligations
owed by social media giants, related third-party data brokers and, more
broadly, renewed interest in the legal right to privacy. Aside from serving as
a cautionary tale for the weakness of Australian privacy laws,21 the Cambridge
Analytica scandal draws our attention to three interrelated facets of the
Gordian knot confronted by the law of privacy today. These facets include: (i)
the increasing commodification of individual privacy; (ii) the normalisation of
harvested for Cambridge Analytica in major data breach’, The Guardian (online), 18 March
2018 <www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influence-
us-election>.
14 In his capacity as founder of the commercial Global Science Research (‘GSR’) enterprise.
15 Evidence to House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 115th Congress of the United
States, Washington, DC, 11 April 2018, 2 (Mark Zuckerberg).
16 This data included friend networks, ‘likes’, newsfeed posts and locations.
17 For a more detailed account of this process, see Jacob Metcalf, Facebook may stop the data
leaks, but it’s too late: Cambridge Analytica’s models live on (9 April 2018) MIT
Technology Review <www.technologyreview.com/s/610801/facebook-may-stop-the-data-
leaks-but-its-too-late-cambridge-analyticas-models-live-on/>.
18 In which the ‘Big Five’ personality traits of openness to experience, conscientiousness,
extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism are correlated against people’s behaviours on
Facebook, such as ‘like’ patterns, across millions of people: ibid.
19 Rosenberg, Confessore and Cadwalladr, above n 13.
20 Carole Cadwalladr, ‘“I made Steve Bannon’s psychological warfare tool”: meet the data war
whistleblower’, The Guardian (online), 18 March 2018 <www.theguardian.com/news/2018
/mar/17/data-war-whistleblower-christopher-wylie-faceook-nix-bannon-trump>.
21 Including the fact that individuals do not have the right to enforce privacy laws and that
‘registered political parties’ are exempt from the operation of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)
(‘the Act’), as are the ‘acts and practices’ of political representatives and
contractors/subcontractors for political parties and representatives (s 7C). As a result, if a
company like Cambridge Analytica was contracted to a political party or member of
Parliament in Australia, the Privacy Act may not govern their activities.
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digital transparency; and, most significantly for the focus of this article, (iii)
the seeming complicity of the individual in the demise of their own privacy.
Since their impact is cumulative, each of these issues is briefly explained
below.
First, the Cambridge Analytica scandal highlights the historical impact of
social media practices on the commodification of individual privacy. The
details of this sophisticated data harvesting exercise have provided a reminder
that individuals are now products as well as consumers.22 Since the personal
information, behaviours, identities and subjectivities we increasingly divulge
to social media and other online sites are valuable to government agencies and
commercial organisations alike, privacy is increasingly commodified in an
attempt to ameliorate its obstructive impact on various economic and political
activities.23 As a consequence of the increasing ‘tradability’ of information
privacy, ‘any aspect of privacy now suffers guilt by association, making
protection of other aspects of privacy far less likely’.24
Such commodification fortifies the second privacy challenge exemplified in
this scandal: in our networked information society,25 individuals are captured
in webs of forced transparency. The Cambridge Analytica incident vividly
demonstrates that as the sale and analysis of personal information become the
dominant business model of many Internet companies,26 it is increasingly
difficult to shield oneself from the effects of networked technologies.27 As a
result, individualistic accounts of privacy may overlook the fact that we are
increasingly reliant upon our friends, family, colleagues and organisations for
the protection of individual privacy. Moreover, the response to this incident
highlights a corollary of forced transparency in the digital age: it is difficult to
escape the unwanted effects of the network. As mentioned at the outset, the
backlash against Facebook in the aftermath of the Cambridge Analytica
scandal manifested in the form of a #DeleteFacbook movement, which
encouraged users to leave Facebook while using a hashtag convention that
ironically emerged through, and depends upon, high levels of participation on
social media.28 Thus, the societal response to the incident appears to
oversimplify and overlook the extent to which Facebook and networked
22 After all, ‘there’s no such thing as a free lunch’: Milton Friedman, There’s No Such Thing
as a Free Lunch (Open Court, 1975).
23 Sebastian Sevignani, ‘The commodification of privacy on the Internet’ (2013) 40 Science
and Public Policy 733, 735.
24 Erwin Chemerinsky, ‘Rediscovering Brandeis’s Right to Privacy’ (2007) 45 Brandeis Law
Journal 643, 651.
25 For a more comprehensive account of the nuances of a networked society, see, eg, Julie E
Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self: Law, Code, and the Play of Everyday Practice (Yale
University Press, 2012).
26 See, eg, Jan Whittington and Chris Jay Hoofnagle, ‘Unpacking Privacy’s Price’ (2012) 90
North Carolina Law Review 1327.
27 This is demonstrated by the fact that only 0.3 per cent of the 87 million Facebook users
whose profiles were harvested by Cambridge Analytica had directly consented to the
collection of their personal information (albeit for academic research purposes). The
remainder of the profiles accessed by the analytics firm were made available as a result of
the actions of those within their networks.
28 Sandra González-Bailón, Want to change Facebook? Don’t delete your account — use it for
good (4 April 2018) Quartz <https://qz.com/1244750/the-delete-facebook-movement-is-
ultimately-self-defeating/>.
468 (2018) 22 Media and Arts Law Review
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technologies, more broadly, have become embedded into the fabric of our
everyday lives.29 As Whittington and Hoofnagle observe, ‘Facebook has
become what Mark Zuckerberg said he intended the service to become: a
utility’.30
In addition to the challenges presented by a more passive participation in
networked technologies, the Cambridge Analytica scandal highlights a third
complication for contemporary privacy: individuals are seemingly complicit
in the demise of their own privacy. Whether it is via accepting certain
permissions sought when installing a new app, agreeing to the terms and
conditions contained in privacy policies when using an online service or more
overtly pursuing visibility on social media, the information at the centre of
many allegations of breach of privacy has been willingly provided by the
individuals in question.31 In the context of Cambridge Analytica, for example,
the psychographic information used by the company was acquired through the
‘informed consent’ of the 270 000 participants of Kogan’s online quiz, as well
as the privacy settings that the participants and members of their network had
selected on Facebook. Notwithstanding the limitations of consent in this
context,32 our increasing entanglement in the erosion of individual privacy
unearths an interesting paradox. In the present digital era, our expressed
personal value of privacy33 appears to be inconsistent with our behavioural
tendencies towards visibility.34 The backlash received by Facebook in the
aftermath of this event is indicative of the anxiety that is experienced by
individuals when confronted with the ramifications of their inconsistent
privacy practices.
Left unscrutinised or uncontested, the issues illustrated within the
Cambridge Analytica incident threaten to undermine the goals of privacy law
while reifying claims made by those who stand to profit from privacy’s
demise.35 In particular, it is argued that in the absence of a more nuanced and
29 Whittington and Hoofnagle, above n 26, 1365.
30 Ibid.
31 See, eg, Alice E Marwick and danah boyd, ‘Networked privacy: How teenagers negotiate
context in social media’ (2014) 16 New Media and Society 1051.
32 Among these, the fact that it is difficult to weigh up the immediate benefits associated with
using online services or apps against the more elusive future detriments caused by a very
complex process of data aggregation and accumulation: Daniel J Solove, ‘Introduction:
Privacy Self-management and the Consent Dilemma’ (2013) 126 Harvard Law Review
1880, 1891.
33 See, eg, Christena Nippert-Eng, Islands of Privacy (University of Chicago Press, 2010);
Chris Hoofnagle et al, ‘How Different are Young Adults from Older Adults When It Comes
to Information Privacy Attitudes & Policies?’ (Departmental Paper, Annenberg School for
Communication, University of Pennsylvania, 14 April 2010) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1589864>.
34 See, eg, Mary Madden et al, ‘Teens, Social Media, and Privacy’ (Report, Pew Research
Center, 21 May 2013) <www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2013/05/PIP_
TeensSocialMediaandPrivacy_PDF.pdf>.
35 Such as Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg, who in a 2010 interview with TechCrunch, stated
that ‘[p]eople have really gotten comfortable not only sharing more information and
different kinds, but more openly and with more people. That social norm is just something
[that has] evolved over time’. Details of this interview can be found, for instance, at
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phenomenal understanding of its human subject, the entanglement of
individuals in the erosion of their privacy will continue to adversely provoke
the functionality of privacy law; which is largely premised upon a view of the
legal subject as an immaterial and detached individual who possesses
presupposed autonomy and self-interested rationality.
B Paradoxical privacy and the complication of technology:
A brief historical overview
Since its inception in the mid to late 19th century, the legal protection of
privacy has been concerned with emerging technologies and associated
practices that contest conventional understandings of individual subjectivity.36
This is illustrated by the fact that the reproduction of private images and the
reporting practices of pamphleteers elicited the protection of privacy in ‘the
most famous of the English privacy cases of the nineteenth century ... Prince
Albert v Strange’;37 while in the United States, the arrival of the handheld,
portable camera and the associated practice of sensational journalism provided
the impetus for Warren and Brandeis’ 1890 landmark article on ‘The Right to
Privacy’.38 In the latter half of the 20th century, following its recognition as a
universal human right,39 legislative attention was once again devoted to the
protection of privacy40 in response to the advent of the computer, and its
information processing capabilities. As such, 21st century anxieties associated
with the privacy implications of smart devices in our pockets, the increasing
use of drones and the indestructability and profitability of digitised, networked
information41 are not historically exceptional.
On the other hand, current socio-technical practices appear to be presenting
a unique challenge for the legal protection of privacy. In the foregoing
vignette it was indicated that beneath the veneer of the short-lived
#DeleteFacebook campaign lies an uneasy contradiction between the
36 Lindsay, above n 10, 141.
37 (1849) 1 H & Tw 1; 47 ER 1302; Megan Richardson, The Right to Privacy: Origins and
Influence of a Nineteenth-Century Idea (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 3.
38 Drawing interesting parallels with 21st century privacy concerns, Warren and Brandeis were
particularly concerned with the media’s increasing interest in gossip and proclivity for
revealing personal things about individuals without their consent, stating that ‘[t]he press is
overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and decency. Gossip is no
longer the resource of the idle and the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with
industry as well as effrontery’: Warren and Brandeis, above n 8, 196.
39 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen
mtg, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948) art 12; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force
23 March 1976) art 17 (‘ICCPR’); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered
into force 3 September 1953) art 8 (‘ECHR’).
40 In Australia, such attention resulted in the implementation of informational privacy laws,
including: Privacy Act 1988 (Cth); Health Records (Privacy and Access) Act 1997 (ACT);
Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW); Privacy and Personal
Information Act 1988 (NSW); Information Act 2002 (NT); Personal Information Protection
Act 2004 (Tas); Information Privacy Act 2000 (Vic); Health Records Act 2001 (Vic).
41 These were among the issues identified as key community concerns in the Standing
Committee on Law and Justice, Legislative Council, Parliament of New South Wales,
Remedies for the serious invasion of privacy in New South Wales (2016).
470 (2018) 22 Media and Arts Law Review
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privacy-related attitudes and behaviours of individuals in the digital era.
Despite claiming to value privacy, and therefore demonstrating outrage when
confronted with the consequences of a breach, through our engagement with
social media and other networked technologies we are often participants in
privacy’s dissolution. As Sarikakis and Winter note, the vast number of social
media users who publicise their personal information ‘pose[s] new challenges
to privacy and thus, social media usage actively shapes and challenges notions
of privacy’.42 While it is trite to observe that serious invasions of privacy can
occur with increasing ease in the digital era,43 this apparent complicity
significantly complicates the traditional view of the legal protection of privacy
as guarding an autonomous, Cartesian subject against intrusions by the state,
or private organisations and other legal persons.
Given that numerous proposals for privacy law reform in Australia continue
to be premised upon the protection of individual autonomy,44 and more
specifically, ensuring that individuals do not ‘lose control over what others
may do with ... [their] personal data’,45 attention must be devoted to
conceptualising the nature and source of our paradoxical engagement with
privacy and exposing its impact on the functionality of privacy law. By doing
so the development and application of privacy law could be founded upon a
sound understanding of the relationship between individual subjects of
privacy law and their material environment, and armed with a more robust
mechanism for making normative judgments about the appropriate extent of
shifting norms of transparency and exposure.
Of course, this paradoxical engagement with privacy has not gone
unnoticed by influential scholars in the field. Research conducted by
Alessandro Acquisti and Jen Grossklags, for instance, has provided empirical
support for an often dichotomous relationship between privacy attitudes and
behaviours, finding that ‘individuals’ generic [privacy] attitudes might often
appear to contradict the frequent and voluntary release of personal information
in specific situations’.46 Drawing upon the insights of behavioural economics,
Acquisti and Grossklags challenge core assumptions of privacy law —
including the presumption of already autonomous privacy subjects — by
demonstrating that these dichotomies most often arise as a result of
‘incomplete information, bounded rationality, and systematic psychological
42 Katharine Sarikakis and Lisa Winter, ‘Social Media Users’ Legal Consciousness about
Privacy’ [2017] Social Media + Society 1, 3 <https://journals.sagepub.com/stoken/default
+domain/cem2tUGgXY37eEjBqIfA/full#article>.
43 Michael Douglas, ‘Characterisation of Breach of Confidence as a Privacy Tort in Private
International Law’ (2018) 41 University of New South Wales Law Journal 490, 490, citing
ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era, above n 6, 17.
44 See, eg, ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era, above n 6; Lenah (2001)
208 CLR 199, 256 [125] (Gummow and Hayne JJ). Studies also reveal that individuals’
accounts of privacy are built around a sense of personal autonomy: see, eg, Sarikakis and
Winter, above n 42, 11.
45 Hon Nicola Roxon MP, ‘Ensuring your right to privacy prevails from the use of personal
data’ (Media Release, 25 May 2012) quoted in Zach Meyers, ‘Autonomy as a Fantasy:
Applying Psychoanalysis to Australian Privacy Law’ (2013) 22 Griffıth Law Review 122,
122.
46 Alessandro Acquisti and Jens Grossklags, ‘Privacy and Rationality in Individual Decision
Making’ (2005) IEEE Security and Privacy 26, 29.
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deviations from rationality’.47 In addressing the shortcomings of legal
frameworks premised upon a system of ‘privacy self-management’, Daniel
Solove similarly notes that cognitive limitations on rational decision-making
combined with structural asymmetries in individual privacy decisions mean
that ‘people routinely turn over their data for very small benefits’.48 Rather
than supporting the market contention that we no longer care about privacy,
however, Solove asserts we must rethink the tasks and parameters of
individual rationality and consent in this area of law.
Specifically responding to the need to reconceptualise privacy in a digital
era, Helen Nissenbaum has developed a normative account of informational
privacy as ‘contextual integrity’.49 By premising privacy on ‘context-relative
informational norms’,50 Nissenbaum’s account is able to explain why one
might wish to disclose certain aspects of their personal life in one particular
circle, but may wish to keep such information private in others.51 While
Nissenbaum’s approach to privacy is compelling and influential,52 it largely
presumes the existence of a rational and autonomous privacy subject ‘who
“arrives” in a social context’53 with an awareness of appropriate and
inappropriate norms of information flow.54 Moreover, in the context of an
increasing complicity of individuals in the dissolution of privacy,
Nissenbaum’s reliance on evolving social norms may, counterproductively,
provide a weak mechanism with which to combat dystopian claims regarding
the diminishing value of privacy.55
Cognisant of the contradictory behaviours of contemporary privacy subjects
as well as the limitations of the assumed liberal subject of privacy law,56 Julie
47 Ibid 26. See also Alessandro Acquisti and Jen Grossklags, ‘What Can Behavioral Economics
Teach Us about Privacy?’ in Alessandro Acquisti et al (eds), Digital Privacy: Theory,
Technologies, and Practices (Taylor and Francis, 2007) 363.
48 Solove, ‘Privacy Self-management and the Consent Dilemma’, above n 32, 1886.
49 See, eg, Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of
Social Life (Standford University Press, 2010).
50 Thereby, eschewing reliance on static understandings of the public–private divide: ibid 15.
51 As articulated in Federica Fornaciari, ‘Pricey privacy: Framing the economy of information
in the digital age’ (2014) 19(12) First Monday s 2.1 <https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php
/fm/article/view/5008/4184>.
52 Particularly in the context of US privacy law and scholarship: see, eg, NYU Steinhardt,
Inside NYU Steinhardt: Helen Nissenbaum on White House Bill to Protect Consumer Online
Privacy (24 February 2012) NYU Steinhardt News: At a Glance <https://steinhardt.nyu.edu
/site/ataglance/2012/02/inside-nyu-steinhardt-helen-nissenbaum-on-the-white-house-bill-to-
protect-consumers-online.html>.
53 Meyers, above n 45, 128.
54 It therefore fails to take seriously the contingent, embodied and developmental nature of
autonomy and the constitutive role of privacy in such development; a perspective broadly
adopted within the social sciences and evident in constitutive accounts of privacy such as
Anita L Allen, ‘Coercing Privacy’ (1999) 40 William and Mary Law Review 723; Julie E
Cohen, ‘Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object’ (2000) 52
Standford Law Review 1373; Robert Post, ‘The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community
and Self in the Common Law Tort’ (1989) 77 California Law Review 957; Paul M Schwartz,
‘Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace’ (1999) 52 Vanderbilt Law Review 1609; Daniel J
Solove, Understanding Privacy (Harvard University Press, 2010).
55 See above n 35.
56 Importantly, Cohen challenges the reliance of US privacy law and scholarship on first-order
liberal commitments ‘to individual autonomy, to an abstract and disembodied vision of the
self, and to the possibility of rational value-neutrality — that derive from the tradition of
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Cohen offers a constitutive account of privacy as ‘breathing room for socially
situated processes of boundary management’.57 Far from signifying the death
of privacy, the propensity of ‘networked selves’ to divulge aspects of their
personal life, in both online and offline realms, is said to form part of the ‘play
of everyday practice’: a process crucial to the ongoing development of
evolving and contingent subjectivity.58 Thus, Cohen calls for privacy law and
policy to ensure that ‘collective practices of surveillance and information
processing cohere with other collective aspirations for self-development’59 by
providing an unscrutinised space for flourishing. Relatedly, Lisa Austin
suggests that many of the tensions present in contemporary privacy
jurisprudence60 can be ameliorated by conceptualising privacy as guarding the
conditions for self-presentation and the evolving process of identity
formation. By justifying the legal protection of privacy on the basis of identity
as opposed to traditional harm- or coercion-based accounts,61 Austin argues
that privacy law will be better able to ‘understand a wide range of privacy
claims’.62
While both Cohen and Austin take important steps forward in
deconstructing and decentring the liberal legal self that privacy laws are
presumed to protect — ‘[i]n particular, the understanding of selfhood as
autonomous, fully individuated, and essentially immaterial’63 — their
respective accounts provide limited insights as to the means by which
emergent subjectivity or identity develop in a direction of human flourishing.
As a result, inadequate attention is devoted to examining the impact of our
divergent privacy values on the process of adaptive subject formation and
articulating the role privacy law may play in either inhibiting or facilitating
this process. Consequently, by deploying a humanistic psychological
framework (and particularly the works of Carl Rogers), this article seeks to
bring to the law of privacy a more nuanced understanding of subjectivity and
the conditions necessary to pursue its purported aims.
As a rebellious field of psychology that devotes significant attention to
challenging the objectifying impulses of liberal thought and analysing the
variables that may facilitate or inhibit the human capacity for
self-actualisation,64 humanistic psychology has an uncharted potential to
provide both a language and normative orientation for the analysis of law’s
liberal political theory within which legal academics are primarily trained’: Cohen,
Configuring the Networked Self, above n 25, 2. Conversely, Cohen suggests that privacy law
and policy should attempt to understand the material reality of ‘evolving, socially situated
subjectivity’: Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self, above n 25, ch 6, 2.
57 See generally ibid.
58 Ibid ch 6.
59 Ibid ch 6, 20.
60 In particular, a ‘containment anxiety’ whereby ‘the privacy impulse surfacing in case law
[throughout the common law world] is undercut by a justificatory dilemma’: Lisa M Austin,
‘Privacy and Private Law: The Dilemma of Justification’ (2010) 55 McGill Law Journal
165, 209.
61 The former deriving from the Millian account of harm and the latter deriving from the
Kantian notion of autonomy: ibid 188–99.
62 Ibid 210.
63 Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self, above n 25, ch 6, 5.
64 See, eg, Christopher M Aanstoos, ‘The Relevance of Humanistic Psychology’ (2003) 43(3)
Journal of Humanistic Psychology 121, 122.
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response to privacy in the context of complex, and often contradictory privacy
practices.65 Specifically, by utilising Rogers’ notion of ‘congruence’,66 this
article will diagnose the pathology that is associated with holding
contradictory privacy attitudes (pursuant to which privacy is valued, while
transparency is practised), and will expose the involvement of privacy law in
reinforcing this pathology. Moreover, by drawing upon Rogers’ ‘necessary
and sufficient conditions’ for human flourishing,67 premised upon the
importance of empathetic relational encounters, this article will begin to
articulate conditions that the nascent law of privacy in Australia ought to
observe if it is to perform its purported function of nurturing human dignity,
autonomy and flourishing.
Before such an analysis can be undertaken, however, it is important to first
consider the legal framework into which a humanistic psychological
understanding of human subjectivity can usefully intervene.
II Problems of privacy in Australian law: From the
relational to the informational
[B]ecause privacy is a focal point for political struggles over identity and because
the struggles take place, in part, through privacy laws — the legal protection of
privacy is a litmus test for the orientation of contemporary legal systems ...68
— David Lindsay
While the Cambridge Analytica vignette serves to illustrate that our
engagement with privacy continues to evolve in response to rapidly emerging,
networked technologies,69 the law of privacy in Australia remains suspended
in a state of hesitation and ambivalence. Unlike other common law
jurisdictions,70 Australian law neither recognises a constitutional right to
privacy, nor offers civil remedies for the invasion of privacy. This is in spite
of the fact that: Australia is a signatory to various international human rights
instruments that expressly incorporate rights to privacy;71 the High Court of
65 This was also argued in Yvonne Apolo, ‘Privacy, Pathologised Subjectivity and the
Secrecy/Transparency Dialectic’ (Paper delivered at Secrecy, Law and Society Workshop,
Sydney, 6–7 February 2014); Yvonne Apolo, ‘Incongruent Selves in Social Media and
Privacy Law: Proposing a Humanistic Intervention’ (Paper delivered at Posting Law:
Emerging Narratives of Law and Justice within Social Media Discourses Symposium,
University of Wollongong, 13 September 2017).
66 See, eg, Carl R Rogers, On Becoming a Person: A Therapist’s View of Psychotherapy
(Houghton Mifflin, 1961) 339.
67 See, eg, Carl R Rogers, ‘The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of Therapeutic Personality
Change’ (1957) 21 Journal of Consulting Psychology 95; Donald Moss, ‘The Roots and
Genealogy of Humanistic Psychology’ in Kirk Schneider, Fraser Pierson and James
Bugental (eds), The Handbook of Humanistic Psychology: Theory, Research and Practice
(SAGE, 2nd ed, 2014) 3, 13.
68 Lindsay, above n 10, 143.
69 For an ethnographic account of such changes see, eg, Marwick and boyd, above n 31.
70 Such as, the United Kingdom (see Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 All ER 995 (‘Campbell’));
United States (see American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Torts (1997) § 652D);
Canada (see Jones v Tsige (2012) 108 OR (3d) 241, regarding intrusion upon seclusion); and
New Zealand (see Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1).
71 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen
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Australia left open the possibility of a tort of unjustified invasion of privacy
in 2002;72 and in 2014, the Australian Law Reform Commission made
recommendations for a carefully limited statutory tort of privacy.73
Both definitional and justificatory uncertainties are among the reasons
commonly advanced for the reluctance of Australian law to recognise a cause
of action in privacy. With the former, Australian superior courts have
referenced the ‘lack of precision of the concept of privacy’,74 whose legal
protection requires the ‘resolution of substantial definitional problems’.75
Regarding the latter, legal scholarship has noted that ‘the generally
unsympathetic treatment of privacy by the Australian legal system ... is linked
to the overwhelmingly consequentialist orientation of Anglo-Australian
society’,76 where a dominant utilitarian ideology renders Australia ‘more
conflicted in attitudes to privacy’.77 The absence in Australia (unlike, for
example, the United Kingdom, United States and New Zealand) of a Bill or
charter of rights has to date prevented the importation of a dignitarian
approach to privacy; thus, although we might say that privacy is about
personal dignity, integrity and flourishing, we do not necessarily adhere to this
in the sense of providing specific legal support.78
Though it is not the intention of this article to provide a detailed account or
appraisal of the law of privacy in Australia,79 this Part will draw attention to
key characteristics of this legal framework in order to interrogate the capacity
of Australian privacy laws to respond to issues surrounding our contradictory
mtg, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948) art 12; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force
23 March 1976) art 17; Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature
20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990) art 16 (‘UNCRC’).
For a brief critique of the commitment to privacy within these international instruments, see
Richardson, above n 37, 112–19.
72 Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199.
73 ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era, above n 6. Recent state-based
recommendations for increased privacy protection have also been ignored: Standing
Committee on Law and Justice, above n 41. See also ALRC, For Your Information:
Australian Privacy?Law and Practice, Report No 108 (2008); New South Wales Law
Reform Commission (‘NSWLRC’), Invasion of Privacy, Report No 120 (2009); Victorian
Law Reform Commission (‘VLRC’), Surveillance in Public, Final Report No 18 (2010).
74 Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 226–7 [43].
75 Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1, 35 [167]. Indeed, as early as 1873, Sir James Fitzjames
Stephen concluded that ‘[t]o define the province of privacy distinctly is impossible’: James
Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (Cambridge University Press, 1967) 160.
76 Lindsay continues by stating that ‘a society that is obsessed with maximising material
welfare is unlikely to be sympathetic to the values underpinning the protection of privacy’:
Lindsay, above n 10, 153.
77 Andrew T Kenyon and Megan Richardson (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law:
International and Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 3. While
‘England can be seen as the first home of utilitarianism’ (at 2), premising privacy not upon
the dignitarian right-based approach of continental Europe but ‘as a species of liberty’ (at
262) instrumental to the attainment of individual flourishing, the implementation of the
Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) (‘HRA’) has injected into English privacy law a greater
concern for the ‘right’ to privacy. On the other hand, both the United States and the
European Union adopt a more explicitly dignitarian account of privacy, albeit with diverging
results: ibid 1–3, 261–3.
78 Ibid.
79 See, above n 12.
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privacy attitudes and behaviours. The first characteristic pertains to the
increasingly informational conceptualisation of legal privacy, which can be
seen to facilitate rather than obstruct privacy’s commodification. The second,
and interrelated characteristic is the manner in which this informational
reading of privacy elides a meaningful understanding of the material self, or
sense of subjectivity, that exists beyond private information.80 It is in response
to these shortcomings that Part III will propose a humanistic psychological
intervention.
A Privacy as information: The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)
As stated in Part I(B) of this article, the advent of computer technology and
information processing capabilities in the 1960s provided the impetus for a
surge in privacy law and literature throughout the West. Thus, whereas the
seminal writings of Jürgen Habermas on the ‘new public’ persuasively
conceptualised privacy according to a spatial dimension (that is, a realm free
from unwanted intervention, within which individual autonomy and identity
could flourish),81 from the late 20th century onwards many theorists began to
conceptualise privacy according to an informational dimension, largely
premised upon the individual’s control of their personal information.82
Although it has proven crucial to posit more nuanced, targeted and contextual
accounts of privacy in the context of the digital information age, this
informational focus has risked reducing and dehumanising the nature and
emphasis of privacy’s legal protection. In the context of Australia, the
concentration on informational privacy has shaped privacy laws that can aptly
be described as ‘information laws, protecting data before people’.83
Aside from the largely incidental protection afforded to privacy via a bundle
of existing common law and equitable principles,84 the most significant form
of privacy protection in Australia is provided by way of the Privacy Act 1988
(Cth) (‘the Act’).85 Premised upon a model of ‘privacy self-management’86
80 Examined in Yvonne Apolo, ‘A Queen, Her Etchings and Strange Behaviour: Reflecting
upon Privacy’s Relational Origins’ (Paper delivered at the Law, Literature and Humanities
Association of Australasia Conference, Complicities, Sydney, 9–12 December 2015).
81 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a
Category of Bourgeois Society (Thomas Burger trans, MIT Press, 1989) [trans of:
Strukturwandel der Offentlichkeit: Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der burgerlichen
Gesellschaft (first published 1962)].
82 See, eg, Alan F Westin, Privacy and Freedom (Athenaum, 1967) 7; Arthur R Miller, The
Assault on Privacy: Computers, Data Banks, and Dossiers (University of Michigan Press,
1971) 25; Charles Fried, ‘Privacy [a moral analysis]’ in Ferdinand D Schoeman (ed),
Phisosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (Cambridge University Press, 1978)
203, 209–10; Richard B Parker, ‘A Definition of Privacy’ (1974) 27 Rutgers Law Review
275, 280; Carolyn Doyle and Mirko Bagaric, ‘The right to privacy: appealing, but flawed’
(2005) 9(1) International Journal of Human Rights 3, 6.
83 Simon Davies, ‘Re-Engineering the Right to Privacy: How Privacy Has Been Transformed
from a Right to a Commodity’ in Philip E Agre and Marc Rotenberg (eds), Technology and
Privacy: the New Landscape (MIT Press, 1997) 143, 156.
84 Such as trespass, nuisance, defamation, passing off, injurious falsehood, the action in
Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 QB 57 and breach of confidence: see, eg, Doyle and Bagaric,
Privacy Law in Australia, above n 7; McDonald, above n 12; and Rolph et al, above n 12,
429–547.
85 State-based privacy legislation includes Health Records (Privacy and Access) Act 1997
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developed in the late 1970s in response to advances in data processing
practices,87 the Act addresses the risk of misuse of personal information by
establishing privacy principles to set minimum standards on the collection,
use, disclosure and handling of personal information by government agencies
and commercial organisations alike.88 However, rather than addressing the
substantive implications of increasing data collection and use, the Act creates
a regime that is narrowly focused on improving technocratic procedures of
information management.89 This is largely reflected in the first Australian
Privacy Principle (‘APP’), which states that ‘[t]he object of this principle is to
ensure that APP entities manage personal information in an open and
transparent way.’90 Additionally, while the Act allows individuals to make a
complaint to the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, if it
appears personal information governed by the Act has been mishandled,91
those individuals cannot instigate legal action for alleged invasions of privacy.
As a result, the Act provides a mediated and transactional form of privacy
protection, whereby individuals acquire only partial control over personal
information, and are increasingly dependent upon governments and markets
for the protection of their privacy. For these reasons, among others, the Hon
Michael Kirby has described the law in Australia as ‘a weak reed in providing
protection for the privacy of individuals’.92
Although the weaknesses of Australia’s Privacy Act are well-documented,93
it is important to highlight the particular limitations of this legislative
framework in responding to the contemporary privacy challenges described in
Part I of this article, specifically: the commodification and normalisation of
individual transparency, and increasing inconsistencies in privacy attitudes
and behaviours. With respect to the former, the Act creates a framework within
which one’s personal information is recognised as valuable and, as a result, is
subject to trade. As opposed to appraising the exact manner in which personal
information is acquired by government agencies and private entities, or the
reasons for which such information is sought in the first place, the Act is
premised upon a consequentialist understanding of the social benefits of data
processing. For instance, according to APP 3 the acquisition of personal
information is legitimised so long as it is ‘reasonably necessary for one or
(ACT); Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW); Privacy and Personal
Information Act 1988 (NSW); Information Act 2002 (NT); Personal Information Protection
Act 2004 (Tas); Information Privacy Act 2000 (Vic); Health Records Act 2001 (Vic).
86 For a critique of ‘privacy self-management’, see Solove, ‘Privacy Self-management and the
Consent Dilemma’, above n 32.
87 This Act gave effect to Australia’s agreement to implement information privacy guidelines
adopted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (‘OECD’) in
1980: OECD, Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal
Data (1980).
88 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) sch 1. The Act applies to government agencies (s 16) and
organisations (s 16A). However, ‘organisation’ excludes (among other things) a small
business (see s 6D). The Act does not apply to individuals, that is, interpersonal privacy.
89 Lindsay, above n 10, 165.
90 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) sch 1 APP 1.
91 Ibid ss 36, 40.
92 Hon Michael Kirby, ‘Publication privacy: Action at last?’ (2012) 17 Media and Arts Law
Review 202, 209.
93 See, eg, Stephen, above n 75.
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more of the entity’s functions or activities’.94 Problematically, however, that
which is ‘necessary’ for many agencies and organisations to function in the
information economy is access to more personal information and sophisticated
data processing techniques. Consequently, Australia’s Privacy Act is imbued
with a transactional attitude towards the privacy of one’s personal information
and is bereft of an understanding of privacy as a condition associated with
nurturing dignity, autonomy or flourishing. Thus, instead of challenging the
increasing commodification and normalisation of individual transparency in
the digital information age, the Act reifies the tradeability and contingency of
privacy.
With respect to the latter issue, the Act is limited in its capacity to question,
navigate or contest the apparent inconsistencies that manifest between one’s
expressed personal value of privacy and behavioural tendency towards
visibility. This is largely a result of the fact that in producing an economy of
information, the Act reduces individuals to data subjects, consumers or
products ‘incorporated in impersonal market-based processes’.95 As such, this
legislative framework is devoid of a meaningful point of connection with the
materiality of the human subject that exists beyond transacted information.
Furthermore, in addition to entangling privacy in a trade relation, wherein
‘privacy is not a right but a commodity, to be exchanged in return for specific
benefits’,96 the Act creates a regime that largely presupposes the willingness
of the data subject to volunteer or exchange their personal information. As
reflected in APP 3 regarding the ‘collection of solicited personal
information’97 and APP 6 regarding the ‘use or disclosure of personal
information’,98 the Act presumes that the personal information solicited by
agencies and organisations is readily and rationally proffered by the subject of
that information, and in the event this has not occurred, the Act allows consent
to legitimise all other forms of collection, use or disclosure.99 Thus, to the
extent that the Act promotes the interests of the individual subject of privacy,
this is founded upon a view of the subject as an immaterial and detached
individual who possesses a form of presupposed autonomy and self-interested
rationality.100 From this perspective, the Act constructs a feeble shield with
which to resist the incessant nature of data collection and question the
willingness of our seeming complicity in the demise of our own privacy.101
94 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) sch 1 APP 3.
95 Lindsay, above n 10, 178.
96 Ibid 2.
97 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) sch 1 APP 3.
98 Ibid sch 1 APP 6.
99 Ibid sch 1 items 3.6, 6.1.
100 Writing from a US perspective, Cohen goes further to say that the ‘networked information
society appears to be the autonomous, rational, disembodied self’s natural milieu,
transcending the particularities of bodies, cultures, and spaces with equal ease’: Cohen,
Configuring the Networked Self, above n 25, 14.
101 Similar criticisms can also be levelled towards the Australian Government’s newly proposed
‘Consumer Data Right’, which aims to enhance competition, and consumer control of data,
within banking, energy and telecommunications sectors. While the Consumer Data Right
does not explicitly concern privacy, the ‘right’ will be implemented by way of amendments
to the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) as well as the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).
Somewhat paradoxically, the proposed laws will attempt to bolster consumer control of
478 (2018) 22 Media and Arts Law Review
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 121 SESS: 30 OUTPUT: Mon Jan 14 19:41:18 2019
/journals/journal/malr/vol22pt4/part_4
B From the relational to the informational: Breach of
confidence
Beyond the regulation of the use and disclosure of personal information under
the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), there is some authority to suggest that Australian
common law provides for the indirect protection of privacy through the
doctrine of breach of confidence.102 The language of breach of confidence is
most commonly used to denote the action that was recognised by Megarry J
in Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd103 as consisting of three limbs.104 First,
there must be information that is confidential in quality. Second, the
information must have been imparted in circumstances where the defendant
was under an obligation not to disclose, or otherwise use, the information.
Third, there must be an unauthorised use or disclosure, or proposed use or
disclosure of that information to the detriment of the claimant.
Nevertheless, although the decision in Coco represented a modern
formalisation of the principles of breach of confidence as a sui generis cause
of action, the equitable doctrine has provided common law jurisdictions with
some legal protections of privacy since at least the 1849 Court of Chancery
decision in Prince Albert v Strange.105 In this seminal decision, Cottenham LC
found that the plaintiff (Prince Albert) was entitled to an injunction on the
basis of a ‘breach of trust, confidence or contract’106 by the defendants
(Strange and Judge), and articulated that ‘privacy was the right invaded’.107
Since the materials used by the defendants to compile and publish a
30-page catalogue describing 63 etchings by Prince Albert and Queen
Elizabeth were of a ‘private character’ and had been ‘surreptitiously and
improperly obtained’,108 Cottenham LC invoked the language of breach of
‘trust’, not to describe an equitable title to property, but ‘to reflect the ordinary
dictionary concept of “trust”, namely reliance on the integrity, ability or
character of a person’.109 In light of the language that was deployed by
Cottenham LC — in a judgment written in the aftermath of Jeremy Bentham’s
personal data by encouraging the sharing of such data with third-party innovators. In
addition, this information sharing will be premised upon the consent of the consumer, who
must balance concerns of privacy, efficiency and competition when faced with the promise
of, for instance, lower electricity bills.
102 See Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1; Wilson v Ferguson [2015] WASC 15 (16 January
2015). In Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71, 128 Gummow J confirmed that ‘equity’s
restrain on the misuse of confidential information as to a person’s personal affairs and
private life may, in that sense, be “protective of privacy”’: G E Dal Pont, Law of
Confidentiality (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2014) 64. Only two lower court decisions have
recognised direct claims for ‘invasion of privacy’: Grosse v Purvis (2003) Aust Torts
Reports 81-706; Doe v Australian Broadcasting Commission [2007] VCC 281 (3 April
2007).
103 (1968) 1A IPR 587 (‘Coco’).
104 Ibid 590, citing Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering Co Ltd (1948) 65 RPC
203.
105 (1849) 1 H & Tw 1; 47 ER 1302.
106 Ibid H & Tw 24; ER 1311.
107 Ibid H & Tw 26; ER 1312.
108 Ibid H & Tw 23; ER 1311.
109 Dal Pont, above n 102, 26.
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utilitarian writings110 and during the time in which John Stuart Mill was
formulating his influential argument in support of private life and individual
flourishing111 — Richardson and Hitchens suggest that we can find in this
judgment an understanding that ‘the choice not to publish “private”
information “kept private” may be a matter of personal choice which others
should be trusted to respect’.112 As such, within this early breach of
confidence decision we find the germ of a conception of privacy premised
upon not only the protection of individual autonomy, but also upholding
interpersonal expectations of trust and integrity. Within this equitable doctrine,
therefore, we find a hint of privacy’s relational origins.113
While only two state-based superior courts have adapted breach of
confidence to more overtly vindicate violations of privacy,114 the ‘indication
thus far is that ... Australian courts will prefer to develop and strengthen
existing causes of action, such as breach of confidence’115 in order to bolster
the protection of privacy in the contemporary digital era. In this sense,
Australia is poised to follow the path already travelled in the United Kingdom
where, under the influence of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) (‘HRA’),116
the law of confidence has experienced ‘an explicit reorientation of the
underlying normative values of the action’117 and is thus an action
‘recognizing a right to privacy in virtually all but name’.118 Interestingly,
however, attempts in the United Kingdom to shoehorn confidentiality into
privacy (or vice versa) have shifted the focus of the action from a relationally
oriented account of privacy protection to an informational one.119
By way of illustration, this shift towards an informational reading of
privacy was most overtly witnessed in the House of Lords decision of
Campbell v MGN Ltd,120 in which Naomi Campbell successfully restrained
MGN from publishing, in breach of confidence, details of her drug addiction
and a photograph of her attending a Narcotics Anonymous meeting. In order
110 See, eg, Philip Schofield (ed), First Principles to Preparatory to Constitutional Code
(Clarendon Press, 1989).
111 John Stuart Mill, ‘On Liberty’ in John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism: On Liberty: Essay on
Bentham (Collins, 1962) 126.
112 Megan Richardson and Lesley Hitchens, ‘Celebrity Privacy and Benefits of Simple History’
in Andrew T Kenyon and Megan Richardson (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law:
International and Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 250, 261
(emphasis added).
113 Apolo, ‘A Queen, Her Etchings and Strange Behaviour’, above n 80.
114 Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1; Wilson v Ferguson [2015] WASC 15 (16 January 2015).
115 Tanya Aplin et al, Gurry on Breach of Confidence: The Protection of Confidential
Information (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2012) 225.
116 Which gives effect to rights within the ECHR, including art 8 (the right to privacy) and art
10 (the right to freedom of expression).
117 Gavin Phillipson, ‘Privacy in England and Strasbourg Compared’ in Andrew T Kenyon and
Megan Richardson (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law: International and Comparative
Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 184, 199.
118 Neil M Richards and Daniel J Solove, ‘Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of
Confidentiality’ (2007) 96 Georgetown Law Journal 123, 171–2.
119 See, eg, Lord Browne of Madingley v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2007] All ER (D) 12
(May); McKennitt v Ash [2006] All ER (D) 200 (Dec); HRH Prince of Wales v Associated
Newspapers Ltd [2008] Ch 57; PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] AC 1081 (Lord
Mance SCJ).
120 [2004] 2 All ER 995.
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to strengthen the ability of breach of confidence to provide privacy protection
in the circumstances of this case,121 the House of Lords transformed the first
limb of Coco (requiring the information to have a ‘quality of confidence’) to
include information that is ‘private’ or ‘personal’ in character and disposed of
the second limb entirely; stating that ‘[the] cause of action has now firmly
shaken off the limiting constraint of the need for an initial confidential
relationship.’122 While the amputation of a need for an initial duty of
confidence has arguably fashioned a cause of action more readily deployable
in the context of invasions of privacy, it has also placed a greater emphasis on
the need to determine whether the character of the information in question is
worthy of privacy protection, and has explicitly reconceptualised privacy as
‘the right to control the dissemination of information about one’s private
life’.123
Although the English evolution of breach of confidence has occurred
against the backdrop of human rights legislation not shared by Australia, in the
High Court decision of Lenah Gleeson CJ demonstrated a willingness to adopt
the private information approach to breach of confidence.124 Thus, what is of
interest for current purposes is the extent to which the simultaneous removal
of relational obligations and the emphasis placed on the character of private
information arms the law of confidence with the conceptual tools required to
navigate the challenges presented by the increasing complicity of individuals
in the demise of privacy. Given that the information at the centre of the
Campbell decision concerned medical treatment and was thus ‘obviously
private’,125 Ms Campbell was able to vindicate her personal privacy. However,
in the absence of ‘obviously private’ information (such as medical data or
information concerning a person’s sexual activities),126 the relevant enquiry
within the extended action in breach of confidence is whether the information
in question is private: that is, whether there was a reasonable expectation of
privacy with respect to that information.127
Interestingly, in shifting the centre of gravity of breach of confidence
towards the protection of private information,128 we witness conceptual
difficulties analogous to those present in the context of information privacy
121 A scenario absent of any circumstances that could impose an obligation of confidence upon
the respondent photographer, as required by the second limb of Coco.
122 Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995, 1002 [14].
123 Ibid 1010 [51].
124 Stating ‘[i]f the activities filmed were private, then the law of breach of confidence is
adequate to cover the case’: Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 225 [39]. However, in the absence
of further High Court authority it remains to be seen whether the law of confidence in
Australia will undergo the same metamorphosis as that which has taken place within the
United Kingdom.
125 Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995, 1020 [95]. In Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, Gleeson CJ also
expressed that information relating to ‘health’ was ‘was to identity as private’: ibid 225–6
[41].
126 See, eg, Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EMLR 20; ETK v News Group
Newspapers Ltd [2011] All ER (D) 197 (Apr).
127 This test was referred to in Doe v Australian Broadcasting Commission [2007] VCC 281
(3 April 2007) [101]–[119]. For examples of the application of this test in the United
Kingdom, see, eg, Douglas v Hello! Ltd [No 3] [2005] 4 All ER 128; McKennitt v Ash
[2006] All ER (D) 200 (Dec); and Hutcheson v News Group [2011] All ER (D) 172 (Jul).
128 As expressed by Lord Hoffman in Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995, 1010 [51].
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legislation. Whereas the equitable action for breach of confidence historically
provided information protection on the basis of upholding interpersonal
expectations of trust and integrity, the metamorphosed doctrine is driven by
the objective of protecting ‘the individual’s informational autonomy’.129 As
Raymond Wacks explains, such an objective must focus both on the quality of
the information in question and the objective social norms governing the
reasonable expectations of the individual.130 In combination, these twin
enquiries are demonstrative of a view of privacy as an informational artefact
that can be readily transacted and, consequently, lost. Thus, in Theakston v
MGN Ltd,131 a case heard at the time the courts in England were transitioning
from the test of confidentiality to that of private information, Ouseley J held
that a famous television and radio presenter should be taken to have consented
to the publication of information about his behaviour at a brothel because he
had previously given publicity to aspects of his private life, including his
intimate relationships, for the purpose of cultivating a particular public
image.132 Similarly, in Author of a Blog v Times Newspapers Ltd,133 Eady J
held that a police officer who sought to restrain the defendant from publishing
his identity as the author of a blog, in which he expressed strong opinions on
issues relating to the police and the administration of justice, did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy due to the fundamentally public nature of
‘blogging’.134 While the action in breach of confidence has been modified in
an attempt to provide more explicit protection to individual privacy, the
concern is that the reduction of privacy to an informational dimension,
wherein privacy is easily transacted and subject to shifting social norms,
provides limited tools with which to interrogate and challenge norms of
individual transparency.
Moreover, to the extent that this doctrine attempts to understand the
behaviour of the human subjects of disclosed information, it is evident that it
does so from within a liberal perspective, according to which the legal subject
is: i) ‘definitionally [and unconditionally] autonomous’; (ii) granted the
capacity for ‘rational deliberation’; and (iii) ‘transcendent and immaterial’,135
much like the Cartesian thinking subject detached from the social and material
world.136 This atomistic and immaterial view of the privacy subject is evident
not only via the reorientation of the action as one protecting ‘informational
autonomy’, wherein the values of ‘human autonomy and dignity’ are
conceived as ‘the right to control the dissemination of information about one’s
private life’,137 but also in the attenuation of the relational dimensions of
129 Ibid, cited in Douglas v Hello! [No 3] [2005] 4 All ER 128, 149–50 [79].
130 Raymond Wacks, ‘Why There Will Never be an English Common Law Privacy Tort’ in
Andrew T Kenyon and Megan Richardson (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law:
International and Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 154,
179–80.
131 [2002] All ER (D) 182 (Feb).
132 Ibid [68].
133 [2009] EMLR 22.
134 Ibid [11], [33].
135 Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self, above n 25, 11.
136 Richard Mohr, ‘Identity crisis: Judgment and the hollow legal subject’ (2007) 11 Law Text
Culture 106, 122.
137 Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995, 1010 [51], 1016 [81].
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privacy. Although courts have indicated that the existence of a relationship of
confidence remains an important contextual factor in assessing one’s
reasonable expectation of privacy,138 it is emphasised that ‘the primary focus
has to be on the nature of the information’.139 In this sense, the action for
breach of confidence has shifted quite dramatically from its equitable
‘origins’, where the privacy of an individual claimant was more explicitly
associated with ‘a subterranean network of families, friends and other[s]’140
and legal intervention occurred on the basis of upholding conscientious
interpersonal comportment.141 In addition to this focus on a definitionally
autonomous and detached subject of privacy, it is discernable within the
preceding description of the doctrine that this area of law presupposes the
capacity of individuals to engage in rational deliberation regarding their
privacy, such that consent to the loss of privacy may be ‘implied’ on the basis
of past behaviour,142 or ‘inferred’ from surrounding circumstances.143
Problematically, the assumption of an atomistic, autonomous and rational
privacy subject, within a legal doctrine that has traditionally frowned upon the
claimant who has ‘courted publicity’,144 does not readily accommodate the
privacy concerns of individuals who, in the interconnected digital age, appear
to willingly pursue increased visibility.
Thus, although definitional and justificatory uncertainties are common
explanations for the primitive nature of Australian privacy law, the above
characteristics also serve to reinforce and contribute to the hesitation and
ambivalence that currently surround this area of law. In particular, by
increasingly adopting an informational understanding of privacy, wherein the
commodification of privacy is legitimised and the materiality of the privacy
subject is reduced, existing legal doctrines provide limited conceptual tools
with which to navigate the paradoxes that surround our contemporary
engagement with privacy. With respect to the challenges articulated in the
context of the Cambridge Analytica scandal, a significant concern associated
with legal discourses deploying transactional language to account for privacy
is that personal information is commodified in the mind of individuals and this
‘may contribute to shifting one’s attention away from the intrinsic value of
privacy and directing it towards a more instrumental understanding’.145 So,
while in 2006 leading Australian privacy scholars propounded the importance
of elucidating the relationship between the rights to privacy and freedom of
expression,146 by 2018 popular discourses of privacy have tended to
interrogate ‘whether protecting our privacy is worth sacrificing
138 See, eg, Lord Browne of Madingley v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2007] All ER (D) 12
(May) [29].
139 McKennitt v Ash [2006] All ER (D) 200 (Dec) [15].
140 Richardson, above n 37, 122.
141 See, eg, Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 1 H & Tw 1; 47 ER 1302.
142 Theakston v MGN Ltd [2002] All ER (D) 182 (Feb) [68].
143 Murray v Express Newspapers plc [2008] 2 FLR 599, 613 [36].
144 See, eg, A v B [2002] 2 All ER 545, 555 [11]. For pre-HRA examples, see also Woodward
v Hutchins [1977] 2 All ER 751; Lennon v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1978] FSR 573.
145 As explained in Fornaciari, above n 51, s 4.4.
146 Especially in light of the changing nature of journalism; with Kenyon and Richardson
stating that such an inquiry ‘lays a base for future privacy research’: Kenyon and
Richardson, above n 77, 9.
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convenience’.147 Over time then, privacy understood in informational terms is
subject to exchange with progressively more insignificant values.
Of further concern, however, is the fact the reductive assumptions
embedded in liberal legal theory — which view the subject of law as an ego
cogito detached from experience148 — are ossified within this prevalent
informational privacy paradigm. By largely dehumanising our understanding
of privacy; isolating the privacy subject from their relational networks; and
assuming that autonomous selves ‘spring full-blown from the womb’,149
extant doctrines of privacy are limited in their ability to account for the
entanglement between individual privacy, on the one hand, and the current
culture of visibility and relentless information exchange, on the other. In order
to provide meaningful protection to privacy, and give effect to a notion of
privacy designed to promote the development of autonomy and the pursuit of
human flourishing, the law of privacy in Australia requires a more nuanced
appreciation of human subjectivity and the relationship between subject
formation and material experiences. To this end, Part III of this article will
propose a humanistic psychological intervention in privacy law.
III A humanistic psychological intervention
We will not find Utopia here. Just humanity.
— Gary Watt150
Given that psychology, whatever its subject matter, is inherently
person-centred and that theorists from both Kantian and Millian schools of
thought have identified autonomy, dignity and human flourishing as values
underpinning the recognition of privacy,151 insights from psychology have
obvious (yet under-utilised) implications for any theory of privacy and privacy
law. The relevance of psychology to legal discourses of privacy is heightened
by the fact that identity formation (or, relatedly, the development of
subjectivity)152 is increasingly acknowledged as the value upon which an
account of privacy protection ought to be justified.153 Specifically, however,
147 The pitting of privacy against convenience is particularly evident in reports concerning the
Cambridge Analytica scandal: Maya Kosoff, ‘Cambridge Analytica is Just the Tip of the
Iceberg’: Why the Privacy Crisis is Bigger Than Facebook (16 April 2018) Vanity Fair
<https://vanityfair.com/news/2018/04/why-the-privacy-crisis-is-bigger-than-facebook>.
Findings to this effect can also be seen in Fornaciari, above n 51.
148 For a comprehensive critique of the Enlightenment subject detached from experience, see
especially Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and History: The Destruction of Experience (Liz
Heron trans, Verso, 2nd ed, 2007) [trans of: Infanzia e storia: Distruzione dell’esperienza e
origine della storia (first published 1978)].
149 Cohen, ‘Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object’, above n 54,
1424.
150 Gary Watt, Equity Stirring: The Story of Justice Beyond Law (Hart Publishing, 2009) 248.
151 For an overview of traditional justifications for the right to privacy, see, eg, Doyle and
Bagaric, Privacy Law in Australia, above n 7, 26–56; Austin, above n 60; Schoeman, above
n 82. For a discussion of both utilitarian and dignitarian conceptions of legal privacy
throughout the West see Kenyon and Richardson, above n 77.
152 See, eg, Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self, above n 25.
153 At n 6, Austin references academic work outside of legal scholarship that focuses on the
relationship between privacy and identity: Austin, above n 60, 168–9.
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this article argues that the field of humanistic psychology is particularly
well-placed to navigate the complexities currently surrounding the legal
recognition of privacy. It proposes this for three key reasons. The first relates
to the mutual goal that has historically enlivened these respective fields of
inquiry: a desire to foster adaptive human functioning and development.154
The second relates to the historical role of humanistic psychology in
challenging and reconstructing the diminished model of human nature
produced by positivist ideologies.155 The third reason relates to the insights
that can be obtained from humanistic psychology regarding the processes by
which one may develop ‘an integrated personal structure and identity, and ...
individual autonomy’.156
Humanistic psychology is often referred to as the ‘Third Force’ in modern
psychology,157 and is attributed with rebelliously returning the notions of
‘self’ and ‘human subjectivity’ to the center stage of psychological enquiry.158
This is because the discipline first emerged, during the 1950s–70s, as a
theoretical protest against the dehumanising, reductive and deterministic
orientations of the prevailing ‘forces’ of behaviourism and psychoanalysis.159
In contrast to more positivistic psychological traditions,160 humanistic
psychology is characterised by an overarching concern with the experience of
154 For a discussion of the goals of humanistic psychology, see, eg, Aanstoos, above n 64. For
a discussion of the philosophical roots of privacy, see, eg, McStay, above n 7.
155 Moss, above n 67, 3–18.
156 Qualities that have been identified as central to the protection of privacy in the context of
Australian law: Peter Hamilton Bailey, Human Rights: Australia in an International Context
(Butterworths, 1990) 284.
157 An early example of this reference is provided by J F T Bugental, ‘The Third Force in
Psychology’ (1964) 4 Journal of Humanistic Psychology 19, 22.
158 By adopting a starting premise that persons are not simply objects but self-conscious
subjects of experience, humanistic psychology is rooted in the humanism that infused
ancient Greek thought and that was revivified during the European Renaissance. In this way,
it shares much in common with many humanist approaches to law that have equally
challenged the manner in which post-Enlightenment legal positivism emphasises objectivity
and, thereby, distances questions of law from the experiences of the human subject. It is
important to note that while existing humanistic inquiries in law open up new ways of
thinking about the nature and function of law and the imagined legal subject, humanistic
psychology (as a person-centred scientific discipline) takes a crucial step further in
theorising and analysing variables associated with the process of self-actualisation. A
selection of works adopting a humanist approach to questions of law include, eg: Judith
Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex’ (Routledge, 1993); John M
Conley and William M O’Barr, Rules Versus Relationships: The Ethnography of Legal
Discourse (University of Chicago Press, 1990); Richard Mohr, ‘Flesh and the Person’ (2008)
29 Australian Feminist Law Journal 31; Jennifer Nedelsky, ‘Embodied Diversity and the
Challenges to Law’ (1997) 42 McGill Law Journal 91; Cassandra Sharp and Marett Leiboff
(eds), Cultural Legal Studies: Law’s popular cultures and the metamorphosis of law
(Routledge, 2015); Charles Taylor, ‘To Follow a Rule ...’ in Craig Calhoun, Edward LiPuma
and Moishe Postone (eds), Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives (Polity Press, 1993) 45.
159 In response to behaviourism, humanistic psychologists reinforced the fact that persons are
not simply objects capable of being mechanistically studied or manipulated; in response to
psychoanalysis, they argued that persons are not slaves to unconscious drives operating in
the dark depths of the psyche. Rather, humans are self-conscious subjects of experience: C
William Tageson, Humanistic Psychology: A Synthesis (Dorsey Press, 1982) 7; James T
Hansen, ‘Humanism as Ideological Rebellion: Deconstructing the Dualisms of
Contemporary Mental Health Culture’ (2006) 45 Journal of Humanistic Counseling 3.
160 Including current ‘positive’ and ‘cognitive’ psychological paradigms.
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‘self’ and the human attribute of ‘self-consciousness’,161 as well as an
endeavour to promote and facilitate optimal human development.162 Since
humanistic psychology ‘care[s] deeply about what it means to be fully
human’,163 and devotes significant attention to analysing the ideal conditions
within which self-actualisation or human flourishing can occur, it provides a
conceptual toolkit capable of not only challenging the objectifying impulses of
informational privacy paradigms, but also ‘generat[ing] a different theory of
the self that privacy protects’.164
Of particular significance to the present enquiry into the impact of our
seemingly discordant privacy attitudes and behaviours on privacy law — a
phenomenon heightened through participation in social media environments
— are the key concepts of Carl Rogers who, alongside the likes of Abraham
Maslow and Rollo May, is most responsible for the creation of humanistic
psychology.165 While the adoption of a phenomenological approach that
emphasises the human desire and capacity for self-actualisation is a unifying
theme throughout humanistic psychology, Rogers spent much of his career
identifying the ‘necessary and sufficient conditions’ that enable humans to
flourish,166 and articulating the processes by which resistances or blocks
towards such progress may be overcome.167
For Rogers, and humanistic psychologists generally, individuals exist in a
constant state of becoming (seeking meaning, value and creativity) and
possess a fundamental motivation towards positive growth (an actualising
tendency).168 Thus, contrary to the more static characteristics of the assumed
liberal legal subject of privacy,169 the self and the human capacity for rational
autonomy are fluid, developmental concepts. Importantly, however, Rogers
identified that our tendency for growth, or self-actualisation, is complicated by
an entrenched need for: (i) ‘self-consistency’, (ii) a sense of ‘congruence’, and
161 See, eg, Donald Polkinghorne, ‘The Self and Humanistic Psychology’ in Kirk Schneider,
Fraser Pierson and James Bugental (eds), The Handbook of Humanistic Psychology: Theory,
Research and Practice (SAGE, 2nd ed, 2014) 87.
162 See, eg, Abraham H Maslow, Motivation and Personality (Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1954).
163 Moss, above n 67.
164 Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self, above n 25, 109.
165 See generally, Tageson, above n 159.
166 While Rogers’ work, first formulated in the 1950s, appears to favour a universalist account
of subjectivity, contemporary applications of Rogerian humanistic concepts are sensitive to
the role of race, gender and sexuality and the politics of interpersonal power in the
development of subjectivity: see, generally, Schneider, Pierson and Bugental, above n 67. It
is also notable that a universalist account of subject formation is often adopted in the context
of privacy scholarship in light of the finding that while privacy norms differ across cultures,
the need for privacy seems to be a universal trait: Alessandro Acquisti, Laura Brandimarte
and George Loewenstein, ‘Privacy and human behavior in the age of information’ (2015)
347(6221) Science 509, 512.
167 See, eg, Rogers, ‘The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of Therapeutic Personality
Change’, above n 67; Moss, above n 67, 13.
168 This differs from Freudian psychoanalysis which views human behaviour as primarily
determined by unconscious and destructive drive states.
169 Also critiqued by Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self, above n 25 and Austin, above
n 60. Outside of privacy law scholarship, Richard Mohr provides a critique of the abstract
nature of the assumed legal person, as ‘frozen in time, lacking any account of agency or
experience’: Mohr, ‘Flesh and the Person’, above n 158, 47.
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(iii) the ‘positive regard’ of others.170 These needs are interrelated and, since
they provide an insight into the attitudinal and behavioural tendencies of the
legal privacy subject, they are each explained below.
According to the phenomenon of self-consistency, individuals function to
maintain consistency (an absence of conflict) within their developing
self-concept (an ‘individual’s conceptualized awareness of the sort of person
he or she is’).171 To this end, individuals cultivate an organismic valuing
process, according to which they organise their values, perceptions and
behaviours in a manner that preserves the consistency of their internal
self-concept.172 In line with the phenomenon of congruence, individuals are
more capable of positive and constructive growth when there exists an
accurate matching between their self-concept and their ongoing material
experiences.173 To provide a simple example used by Rogers, if a person is at
a social gathering that they find to be boring but they communicate to the host
(or perhaps, large digital audiences) that they are having a fun time, there is
a lack of congruence between this person’s subjective experience and their
outward representation. Rogers calls the discrepancy between two discordant
conceptions of self, or between one’s external reality and subjective
experience, incongruence. Rogers, like Nuttin before him,174 holds that where
this incongruence is large, the seeds of maladaptive development are sown.175
This is because incongruence — manifesting as tension, anxiety or
disorientation — undermines one’s desire for self-consistency and may,
therefore, trigger the operation of defense mechanisms that either distort one’s
organismic valuing process or deny ongoing experiences.176 Incongruence,
therefore, represents a significant obstacle in the ongoing process of individual
flourishing.
Given our status as relational beings, situated in webs of connection with
and dependence upon others, Rogerian theory posits that the importance of the
organising concepts of self-consistency and congruence emerges from a more
basic and powerful psychological need for positive regard; a need that can
only be satisfied by others.177 In an environment where an individual
170 See, eg, Carl R Rogers, Client-Centred Therapy (Houghton Mifflin, 1951); Daniel Cervone
and Lawrence A Pervin, Personality: Theory and Research (John Wiley & Sons, 10th ed,
2007) 176–8.
171 Tageson, above n 159, 62. This is an emergent and subjective view of self, formed on the
basis of past and present experiences as well as future expectancies; Richard L Evans, Carl
Rogers: The Man and His Ideas (E P Dutton, 1975).
172 See, eg, Carl R Rogers, ‘A Theory of Therapy, Personality and Interpersonal Relationships
as Developed in the Client-Centered Framework’ in Sigmund Koch (ed), Psychology: A
Study of a Science — Volume 3: Formulations of The Person and the Social Context
(McGraw-Hill, 1959) 184, 222.
173 Rogers, On Becoming a Person, above n 66, 339.
174 See, eg, Joseph Nuttin, Psychoanalysis and Personality: A Dynamic Theory of Normal
Personality (George Lamb trans, Greenwood Press, 1975) [trans of: Psychoanlyse en
spiritualistische opvatting van de mens (first published 1953)].
175 Tageson, above n 159, 96.
176 See, eg, Carl R Rogers and B F Skinner, ‘Some Issues Concerning the Control of Human
Behavior’ (1956) 124(3231) Science 1057; Robert Frager and James Fadiman, Personality
and Personal Growth (Pearson Education, 6th international ed, 2005) 320–1.
177 Carl Rogers and John Wood, ‘Client-Centered Theory’ in Arthur Burton (ed), Operational
Theories of Personality (Brunner/Mazel, 1974) 211; Tageson, above n 159.
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experiences unconditional acceptance and respect from significant social
others, they are, theoretically, able to grow in accordance with their
actualising tendency; evaluating experiences in a manner consistent with
intrinsic needs, free from the encumbrances of distortion and denial.178 On the
other hand, when individuals are exposed to social environments that impose
upon them ‘conditions of worth’, according to which certain aspects of one’s
self-concept are valued or rewarded while others are not, their capacity for
actualisation may be thwarted via the introjection of such conditions into
identity.179 When these values are introjected they operate as an internalised
social other, impacting upon or ‘replacing organismic valuing as the principle
governing the individual’s attitudes and behavior’.180 Thus, in the pursuit of
self-consistency, individuals subject to conditional regard may selectively
interpret subjective experiences and, as a consequence, encounter greater
discrepancies between their ‘real’ value system, or awareness of self, and their
distorted self-concept.181 For Rogers, this type of incongruence is the single
most significant source of psychopathology, as it perverts the natural
directions of the actualising tendency.
To summarise, Rogerian humanistic psychology maintains that humans are
self-actualising beings, motivated towards (but not always realising) positive
growth, psychological resilience and the ideal of autonomous, rational
functioning. As part of this process of becoming, we seek to maintain a sense
of congruence between our self-concept and our experiences. Nevertheless,
we are relational beings and, as a result, this actualising tendency is contingent
upon and subject to the vicissitudes of one’s interpersonal, social and
institutional environment. The seeds of maladjustment and pathology are
sown when exposure to conditions of worth triggers incongruence and leads
to the increasing introjection of external values, and the denial or distortion of
subjective experience.182 Thus, while the unimpeded (or aspirational), ‘fully
functioning person’ has characteristics that tend towards increasing rationality,
autonomy and constructive social relations (attributes possessed by the
assumed subject of privacy law), on the opposing side of the continuum, the
pathologised self is characterised by a bifurcated actualisation tendency:
‘functioning to preserve and enhance both the real experiencing self and the
somewhat discrepant self-concept’.183
Importantly, while Rogers acknowledged the adverse impact of overtly
dehumanising environments on the process of self-actualisation, his account is
178 Rogers, ‘A Theory of Therapy, Personality and Interpersonal Relationships as Developed in
the Client-Centered Framework’, above n 172, 235.
179 Carmel Proctor, Roger Tweed and Daniel Morris, ‘The Rogerian Fully Functioning Person:
A Positive Psychology Perspective’ (2016) 56 Journal of Humanistic Psychology 503, 506.
180 Thomas G Patterson and Stephen Joseph, ‘Person-Centered Personality Theory: Support
from Self-determination Theory and Positive Psychology’ (2017) 47 Journal of Humanistic
Psychology 117, 121–2.
181 David Murphy et al, ‘Unconditional Positive Self-Regard, Intrinsic Aspirations, and
Authenticity: Pathways to Psychological Well-Being’ (2017) Journal of Humanistic
Psychology 1, 3.
182 See, eg, Rogers, ‘A Theory of Therapy, Personality and Interpersonal Relationships as
Developed in the Client-Centered Framework’, above n 172. Empirical support for these
concepts is outlined in ibid.
183 Tageson, above n 159, 179.
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more concerned with the incongruence that emanates in the context of subtle
and accepted kinds of domination, which nevertheless functions to place
people under the control of others.184 Since ‘networked’ privacy subjects are
more frequently engaging in behaviours of exposure and visibility, that both
facilitate and accede to aspects of private life coming under the control and/or
manipulation of others, Rogerian insights can aid in understanding the impact
of such behaviours on individual subjectivity and the role that laws of privacy
play in either facilitating or inhibiting positive subject formation. These
insights may enhance the ability of privacy law to move in the direction of its
liberal aspirations, committed to the desirability of individual
self-determination and autonomy (however illusory these values may be).185
To this end, the remainder of this article will explore the implications of a
humanistic psychological understanding of subjectivity for the legal
protection of privacy in the Australian context.
IV Incongruent selves and privacy law
How is it that a person can be consciously struggling toward one goal while her [or
his] whole organic direction is at cross-purposes with this?186
— Carl Rogers
Brought into dialogue with privacy law scholarship, Rogerian humanistic
psychology provides a lens through which we can better understand ‘the self
that privacy is supposed to benefit’.187 As if responding to Austin’s concern
that ‘[a]lthough identity ... is always constructed in relation with and to others,
it is problematic from the perspective of liberalism to posit that this identity
is fully constructed by others’,188 Rogers articulates a dynamic, embodied and
dialectical process of self-development. While individuals possess an internal
organismic valuing process motivated by a fundamental tendency towards
fulfilment and actualisation (and, as such the capacity for rationality,
autonomy and self-determination), this process is always partially determined
by context and by others.189 Consequently, a dialectical interface exists
between an individual’s actualising tendency and the social, political and legal
184 Ibid 121; Frager and Fadiman, above n 176, 319–20; Carl R Rogers, Carl Rogers on
Personal Power: Inner Strength and Its Revolutionary Impact (Bantam Doubleday Dell,
1977). In the latter half of his career, Rogers began to pay more attention to preventative
efforts aimed towards rehumanising powerful social and political institutions.
185 That is, many post-structuralist accounts of identity or subjectivity, often influenced by the
work of Michel Foucault, question the existence of an autonomous self, capable of
self-determination. Nevertheless, while acknowledging the contingent nature of these liberal
values, studies in psychology (including humanistic psychology) support the notion of these
liberal values as psychological needs or goals towards which individuals aim: see, eg,
Alexios Arvanitis and Konstantinos Kalliris, ‘A self-determination theory account of
self-authorship: Implications for law and public policy’ (2017) 30 Philosophical Psychology
763.
186 Rogers, Carl Rogers on Personal Power, above n 184, 244.
187 Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self, above n 25, ch 5, 3.
188 Austin, above n 60, 203.
189 Daniel B Sleeth, ‘The Self and the Integral Interface: Toward a New Understanding of the
Whole Person’ (2006) 34 Humanistic Psychologist 234, 257.
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environment, which can either facilitate or hinder this process.190 Understood
in this way, the formation of subjectivity is partly intersubjective: one draws
into their self-concept the conditions and values emanating from others.191
A Incongruence in the contemporary privacy milieu
Applied to the current privacy milieu, Rogerian humanistic psychology
exposes our incongruence. The discrepancy that manifests between, on the
one hand, our expressed value of privacy and, on the other, our behavioural
tendencies towards visibility, can be conceptualised as a ramification of our
positionality in a society that increasingly commodifies personal information,
normalises digital transparency and reinforces and promotes
self-disclosure.192 While research reveals that individual privacy is valued,193
performing a vital role in the development of critical, constructive and
differentiated subjectivity,194 individuals are nevertheless enmeshed within a
socio-technical environment increasingly premised upon the benefits of
individual transparency. Within this context our everyday interactions are
often mediated by surveillant digital landscapes that reward acts of
self-disclosure and visibility with promises of convenience, entertainment,
social recognition and/or security;195 as such, we are frequently exposed to
conditions of worth, according to which transparency is prized while privacy
is commodified. Thus, as a corollary of our status as relational beings existing
in a constant state of becoming and possessing a basic need for the positive
regard of others, these conditions of worth provide the fertile ground for
introjection: a process through which externally imposed conditions
(problematically premised upon a reductive and objectified view of the human
subject) are internalised, leading to the distortion or fragmentation of one’s
intrinsic valuing system.
Importantly, however, to submit that increasing acts of self-disclosure or
visibility are manifestations of a process of internalisation is not to suggest
that the behavioural tendencies of privacy subjects are a result of
environmental conditioning and, therefore, an incontrovertible and innocuous
indication of shifting social norms. Given that humans are ‘self-conscious
subjects of experience’, as opposed to mere objects of stimulus–response
associations,196 the introjection of external conditions of worth does not
simply reshape our thoughts and actions; it can introduce inconsistency into
the self-system. Pursuant to Rogerian humanistic psychology, while one’s
190 Richard M Ryan and Edward L Deci, ‘An Overview of Self-Determination Theory: An
Organismic-Dialectical Perspective’ in Edward L Deci and Richard M Ryan (eds),
Handbook of Self-Determination Research (University of Rochester Press, 2002) 3, 8.
191 Sleeth, above n 189.
192 On the emergence of a culture of confession and visibility see, eg, Harry Blatterer, Pauline
Johnson and Maria R Markus (eds), Modern Privacy: Shifting Boundaries, New Forms
(Palgrave MacMillan, 2010).
193 See above n 153.
194 For an overview of the commonly cited benefits of privacy, see, eg, Trina J Magi, ‘Fourteen
Reasons Privacy Matters: A Multidisciplinary Review of Scholarly Literature’ (2011) 81
Library Quarterly 187.
195 Kevin D Haggerty and Richard V Ericson, ‘The surveillant assemblage’ (2000) 51 British
Journal of Sociology 605, 614–15.
196 Tageson, above n 159, 7.
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unimpeded self-concept (and intrinsic value system) will remain in conscious
awareness,197 the need to maintain consistency within the self-system can
encourage the formation of distorted behavioural tendencies that accord with
introjected conditions (for instance, of individual transparency and
commodification) and, eventually, prompt the development of an ‘external
locus of evaluation’, according to which an individual loses trust in their own
internal judgments and increasingly defers to the external judgments of
others.198 It is the resulting divergence between those attitudes and behaviours
that are consistent with one’s actualising internal value system (‘I value
privacy and think it is important’) and those that satisfy introjected conditions
of worth premised upon an objectified view of the privacy subject as a
commodity (‘I must divulge personal matters to exist in our networked digital
era’), which produces the state of incongruence.
There are three main reasons as to why this state of incongruence ought to
be conceptualised as a pathology for the legal protection of individual privacy.
First, incongruence, which is commonly experienced as tension or anxiety,
can trigger defence mechanisms, such as distortion, denial or rationalisation,
which paradoxically operate to reinterpret subjective experiences in a manner
consistent with one’s compromised self-concept.199 As such, if
unaccompanied by facilitative social conditions, anxieties associated with
privacy-invasive behaviours may be deflected by rationalising such
behaviours as a necessary corollary of the purported benefits of individual
transparency. Moreover, since an incongruent individual is one who becomes
estranged from their internal valuing system and acquires an ‘external locus of
evaluation’, that individual is more likely to seek out and defer to the views
of others, now readily available through online social networks. Such
phenomena therefore operate to further reinforce diminishing privacy. These
processes of rationalisation and external evaluation are evident in the above
discussion of the Cambridge Analytica incident, in the aftermath of which
anxious and concerned individuals ironically turned to social media, using a
hashtag convention to express their privacy concerns. As one commentator
observed, this simultaneous demonisation of and reliance upon the social
media platform is indicative of the ‘further normalisation of surveillance and
the lack of privacy that comes with being an internet user nowadays’.200
Second, since incongruence is the product of a distorted self-concept it
fragments one’s actualisation tendency and, therefore, blocks or perverts the
attainment of values that have traditionally justified the legal protection of
privacy. While Rogers posits that under favourable environmental conditions
the unimpeded self is theoretically free to actualise in the direction of intrinsic
needs, moving towards the full attainment of embodied rationality, autonomy
and self-determination,201 a state of unresolved incongruence undermines the
development of these qualities. Thus, contrary to the goals of liberal accounts
197 Rogers, Client-Centred Therapy, above n 170, 484.
198 Patterson and Joseph, above n 180, 122.
199 Cervone and Pervin, above n 170, 194.
200 Ivan Manokha, ‘Cambridge Analytica’s closure is a pyrrhic victory for data privacy’, The
Conversation (online), 3 May 2018 <https://theconversation.com/cambridge-analyticas-
closure-is-a-pyrrhic-victory-for-data-privacy-96034>.
201 Carl R Rogers, Freedom to Learn (Merrill, 1969).
Incongruent selves 491
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 134 SESS: 30 OUTPUT: Mon Jan 14 19:41:18 2019
/journals/journal/malr/vol22pt4/part_4
of privacy law, incongruence impedes the natural directions of adaptive
human flourishing.202
Third, as Rogers observed, the state of incongruence most commonly
manifests as ‘discordant or incomprehensible behaviors’,203 and this pattern of
behaviour radically collides with the exercise of rational choice expected of
the legal subject of privacy law.204 Armed only with an understanding of
subjectivity as static, already autonomous, fully individuated and detached
from experience, legal doctrines of privacy may read seemingly voluntary acts
of transparency,205 visibility or exposure206 as further evidence of diminished
or unreasonable expectations of privacy.207 What is more, the
‘incomprehensible behaviors’ associated with incongruence present particular
difficulties for the development of privacy law in Australia, where a utilitarian
account of legal privacy positions this value as a choice that may be, and
frequently is, outweighed by other legitimate choices such as commerce,
convenience or public security.208 While utilitarian accounts recognise and
support the value of privacy in promoting ‘self-development’ and ‘individual
flourishing’, such accounts are more susceptible to the logic that ‘the fact that
people surrender [privacy] for rather small gains is a sign they don’t really, or
most people don’t really, value it that much’.209
Thus, by deploying the language and key concepts of humanistic
psychology we can more fully appreciate that paradoxical privacy behaviours
are not the product of a ‘rational chooser’210 for whom privacy is a largely
insignificant value, but are signs and symptoms of a state of incongruence,
which emerges within and is perpetuated by the inescapable network effects of
the digital information age. In this way, the contradictions surrounding, for
202 Since incongruence is ‘experience-specific and context-bound’, it is being deployed to
describe the privacy-related attitudes and behaviours of subjects of privacy law, as opposed
to representing a general ‘diagnosis’: see, eg, Devang Vaidya, ‘Re-visioning Rogers’ Second
Condition — Anxiety as the face of ontological incongruence and basis for the principle of
non-directivity in PCT therapy’ (2013) 12 Person-Centered & Experiential Psychotherapies
209, 213–15.
203 Rogers, ‘A Theory of Therapy, Personality and Interpersonal Relationships as Developed in
the Client-Centered Framework’, above n 172, 197–203.
204 Cohen, eg, uses the term ‘rational chooser’ to describe the assumed subject of information
privacy law: Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self, above n 25, ch 5, 4. More generally,
Mohr critiques the character of the legal subject as ‘frozen in time’ and ‘cut off from others’:
Mohr, ‘Flesh and the Person’, above n 158.
205 Eg, adopting and participating in networked technologies that leave data trails.
206 Eg, actively posting, commenting and sharing images on social media.
207 As Part II illustrated, a reasonable expectation of privacy is a threshold requirement that a
plaintiff must demonstrate in order to vindicate their claim to privacy within the extended
doctrine of breach of confidence. This test was referred to in Doe v Australian Broadcasting
Commission [2007] VCC 281 (3 April 2007) [101]–[119]. For examples of the application
of this test in the United Kingdom, see, eg, Douglas v Hello! [No 3] [2005] 4 All ER 128;
McKennitt v Ash [2006] All ER (D) 200 (Dec); and Hutcheson v News Group [2011] All ER
(D) 172 (Jul).
208 See, eg, Kenyon and Richardson, above n 77.
209 A statement made by legal economist Richard Posner in Big Think, Interview with Richard
Posner (Video Interview, 21 November 2007) <https://bigthink.com/videos/judge-richard-
posner-privacy>.
210 A term used by Cohen to refer to the privacy claimant assumed within US information
privacy laws: Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self, above n 25, ch 5, 4.
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instance, the behaviour of individuals who were either involved in or
responded to the privacy breaches by Cambridge Analytica and Facebook, can
begin to be unraveled.
B The incongruency impasse and the role of privacy law
The emergence of incongruent selves in the context of privacy protection does
not only challenge the functionality of privacy law. Rather, the assumptions
embedded in legal doctrines of privacy serve to further reinforce incongruence
in a manner that illogically stymies the historical aims of this area of law. As
Part II articulated, the legal protection of privacy in Australia is reliant upon
the logic of information exchange and control. With specific reference to the
key characteristics of both the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and the doctrine of
breach of confidence, Part II demonstrated how an informational reading of
privacy not only elides a meaningful point of connection with the material
subject of privacy law, it also reifies the reductionistic attributes of the liberal
legal subject. Pursuant to this dominant account, the presupposed subject of
privacy protection is a fully autonomous and self-interested individual, largely
divorced from the material world, who thinks and acts in a logical manner, and
parts with personal information following rational deliberation.211
Nevertheless, far from being ‘an Aristotelian “unmoved mover” or the
Cartesian ego hovering above its affairs’,212 those who seek the benefits of
privacy protection are embodied individuals situated in webs of connection
with others, in both material and digital worlds; for whom the capacity to
practice autonomy, rationality and self-determination is evolving and
contingent and for whom participation in privacy-erosive activities, such as
active social media use, forms part of the ‘play of everyday practice’.213 By
reflecting back to the privacy claimant a commodified account of privacy and
a largely distorted, static and qualified understanding of subjectivity, privacy
law is complicit in perpetuating incongruence; a state that ‘demands
resolution’214 in order to restore one’s actualising tendency.
How, then, ought the law of privacy overcome this incongruency impasse?
Given that humanistic psychology is grounded by a desire to promote positive
human development, it holds the view that pathologised states of
incongruence or internal antagonism are capable of constructive resolution if
accompanied by facilitative social-environmental conditions.215 According to
Rogers’ ‘necessary and sufficient conditions’ for human flourishing,216 the
answer lies in the radical power of an empathetic relational encounter. Since
the formation of subjectivity is partially intersubjective, when an individual in
211 These attributes are reflected in the way in which the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) presumes the
willingness of the data subject to exchange his or her personal information and allows
consent to legitimise all other forms of collection, use or disclosure. These attributes are also
visible within the assessment of the claimant’s ‘reasonable’ expectation of privacy in the
doctrine of breach of confidence.
212 Vaidya, above n 202, 214.
213 Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self, above n 25.
214 Frager and Fadiman, above n 176, 321.
215 Patterson and Joseph, above n 180, 122.
216 Widely considered to be his most enduring contribution to psychology: see, eg, Cervone and
Pervin, above n 170, 194.
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a heightened state of incongruence is brought into a relational encounter with
a genuine and empathetic other, in the absence of conditions of worth:
previously denied or distorted experiences will once again emerge into awareness,
become accurately symbolized and integrated into the self-concept, and allow the
actualizing tendency to operate in a unitary, more holistic way. Harmony will be
restored, where before there was division, and the ideal of the fully functioning
person will be approached.217
Thus, as contemporary research findings continue to support,218 empathetic
relational encounters are central to a reduction of incongruence, an increased
trust in the experiencing self and an adaptive reintegration of one’s actualising
tendency. Importantly, however, Rogerian humanistic psychology posits that
the facilitative relational conditions of empathy, genuineness and
unconditional positive regard are not only crucial to the creation of
constructive interpersonal encounters; they are also applicable to broader
political and social contexts.219
Since the law of privacy in Australia is deficient, in comparison with other
Commonwealth legal systems, its future development may assume a variety of
shapes. Some of these include: implementing a statutory cause of action for
the invasion of privacy,220 recognising a tort of privacy at general law,221 or
extending the action for breach of confidence.222 This article contends that the
future development of Australian privacy law and scholarship should be
premised upon a path that best allows law to empathetically and responsively
encounter the materiality of its privacy subjects. That is, a path that promotes
an understanding of privacy claimants as individuals in a fluid state of
becoming, enmeshed in webs of connection with and dependence upon others,
and whose capacity for self-actualisation is situated in a dialectical
relationship with the social environment. In this way, by becoming cognisant
of the commodifying proclivities of an informational reading of privacy, and
eschewing the reductionistic expectations of the liberal legal subject, doctrines
and discourses of privacy will be able to more effectively pursue (as opposed
to unconsciously hinder) the goals of nurturing human dignity, autonomy and
flourishing.
While it is beyond the scope of this article223 to articulate the model of
privacy law that might best achieve the ‘necessary and sufficient conditions’
for human flourishing, hints of such an approach can be found within the
equitable origins of breach of confidence. Interestingly, within a series of early
217 Tageson, above n 159, 97; Rogers, On Becoming a Person, above n 66.
218 See, eg, Howard Kirschenbaum and April Jourdan, ‘The Current Status of Carl Rogers and
the Person-Centred Approach’ (2005) 42 Psychotherapy 37; George Silberschatz,
‘Comments on “The necessary and sufficient” conditions of therapeutic personality change’
(2007) 44 Psychotherapy 265.
219 Rogers, Carl Rogers on Personal Power, above n 184; Frager and Fadiman, above n 176,
319.
220 As recommended by various law reform commissions, including ALRC, Serious Invasions
of Privacy in the Digital Era, above n 6.
221 Following, for instance, the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Hosking v Runting [2005] 1
NZLR 1.
222 The preference for which was confirmed by the House of Lords in Campbell v MGN Ltd
[2004] 2 All ER 995.
223 But not forthcoming research by the author.
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19th century cases,224 before the relational requirements of breach of
confidence were formalised and delimited by Megarry J,225 we witness an
approach to privacy protection that both acknowledges and upholds the
centrality of conscientious interpersonal relationships. In Prince Albert v
Strange, for instance, an injunction was successfully granted to vindicate the
privacy interests of Prince Albert and Queen Victoria due to the fact that the
etchings in question were symbolic of an intimate pastime enjoyed by the
Royal couple and, as a result, the defendants Strange and Judge engaged in
disingenuous interpersonal behaviour by ‘surreptitiously and improperly’
obtaining these.226 Given the significant role that genuine and empathetic
relational encounters play in the process of self-integration and personal
flourishing, the law of privacy should not lose sight of the importance of
upholding expectations of conscientious interpersonal comportment,
including in the context of information relationships.227 As Richardson
observes:228
we might find real benefit in recognising the right to privacy as a right not just for
discrete individuals, or even particular groups, but as a right that also serves the
needs and concerns of multiple connected individuals — opening up a prospect of
a right which can function effectively in an interconnected world ...229
Of course, as the preceding analysis warns, whichever path the future
development and deployment of privacy law adopts it must be accompanied
by a nuanced understanding of subject-formation, and attend to the causes and
effects of discordant privacy behaviours, so as to not perpetuate the pathology
of incongruence nor unduly strip the pathologised subject of all privacy
protection.230
V Conclusion
If this is the age of information, then privacy is the issue of our times ...231
— Alessandro Acquisti, Laura Brandimarte
and George Loewenstein
At the outset of this article, the Cambridge Analytica scandal was utilised
to illustrate the problems that the legal protection of privacy currently faces.
224 Such as Gee v Pritchard (1818) 2 Swan 402; 36 ER 670; Abernethy v Hutchinson (1825) 1
H & Tw 28; 47 ER 1313; and Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 1 H & Tw 1; 47 ER 1302.
225 In Coco (1968) 1A IPR 587.
226 (1849) 1 H & Tw 1, 24; 47 ER 1302, 1311.
227 For a discussion of information relationships, see Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog,
‘Privacy’s Trust Gap: A Review’ (2017) 126 Yale Law Journal 1180, 1185.
228 In her comprehensive overview of early attempts to fashion legal privacy: Richardson,
above n 37.
229 Ibid 122.
230 It is appropriate to note here that the Australian Government’s proposed Consumer Data
Right, discussed at above n 105, is poised to perpetuate such incongruence by explicitly
drawing privacy protection into a complex relationship with competition and consumer
protection. The ‘four key principles’ of this legal framework simultaneously encourage
consumers to share data (so as to drive innovation) and safeguard their privacy and security:
Treasury (Cth), Consumer Data Right (9 May 2018) <https://treasury.gov.au/consumer-data-
right/>.
231 Acquisti, Brandimarte and Loewenstein, above n 166, 509.
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While a cursory glimpse of relevant history demonstrates that the legal
protection of privacy has always been concerned with challenges posed by
emerging socio-technical practices, it was suggested that the controversy
surrounding Cambridge Analytica serves to draw our attention to three unique
complications of privacy in the contemporary, digital information age. These
complications were described as the cumulative commodification and
normalisation of individual transparency, and the increasing contradiction of
the privacy claimant — an individual who professes to value privacy, but will
still click ‘install’ without reading the fine print, or post intimate content to
‘friends’ they know little about.
Nevertheless, implicit within the conceptual framework subsequently
adopted in this article is perhaps the most important lesson that privacy law
can learn from this recent furore. As whistleblower Christopher Wylie
explained, crucial to the ‘success’ of Cambridge Analytica’s data harvesting
exercise was its ability to draw from the insights of personality psychology in
order to create and deploy a ‘psychological warfare tool’. In response, this
article contends that as social media giants and third-party data brokers turn
to knowledge within psychology to find new ways to encourage participation
in networked technologies and enhance the profitability of personal
information, the law of privacy would do well to draw upon such knowledge
in the course of formulating a proposed solution.
In particular, this article has argued that the field of humanistic psychology
is especially well-placed to navigate the complexities currently surrounding
the legal recognition of privacy and respond to the shortcomings of Australia’s
ambivalent privacy law framework. By adopting the dissenting humanism of
humanistic psychology, it is suggested that we can challenge positivistic
tendencies to divorce issues of law from the experiences of its human subject,
or to reduce human subjects to an ego cogito detached from experience.232
More specifically, however, by deploying the empirically-informed concepts
of humanistic psychology, we can bring to law an enhanced understanding of
the privacy subject.
Armed with an account of adaptive subject formation as a dynamic,
embodied and dialectical process, subject to the pathologising effects of
incongruence, privacy law and scholarship will be better placed to unravel the
complex contradictions that characterise much of our contemporary
engagement with privacy. While this article has been mostly conceptual, in
order to locate the problem and lay the foundations for a potential way
forward, future research will need to focus on what a humanistic
psychological intervention into privacy law might look like practically. As a
first step, in contrast to the current informational paradigm, such an
intervention will have to call upon privacy’s relational roots.
232 Agamben, above n 148.
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